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On Buddhism, Divination and the
Worldly Arts: Textual Evidence from the
Theravåda Tradition
David Fiordalis∗
Introduction
The categories of “Buddhism” and “divination” have not
typically been combined in scholarly literature on either Buddhism
or divination.1 More often than not they have been distinguished,
giving the misleading impression that there is no such thing as
“Buddhist divination.” When acknowledged, it has normally been
interpreted as Buddhists engaging in “non-Buddhist” practices or
as “indigenous” or “originally” non-Buddhist practices accreting to
or entering into structural relations with Buddhism. Such
distinctions as these have also informed the analytical repertoires
used by scholars to understand the history, culture, and religion of
places where Buddhism has flourished, and the apparent disconnect
between what some Buddhist texts seem to say and what history
and ethnography seem to show. Recently, however, scholars have
begun to call for a different approach, one that “focuses on the way
∗
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1

For example, preliminary research for this article yielded no entries for
divination or astrology in Buswell’s 2004 Encyclopedia of Buddhism; nor
did a cursory perusal of James Lewis’s 1994 The Astrology Encyclopedia
provide any information on Buddhism. The 1985 first edition of the
Encyclopedia of Religion contains a general entry on divination by Evan
Zuesse, which has some discussion of Chinese divination but little specific
discussion of Buddhism. A separate section on Greek and Roman divination
was added for the 2005 edition. If one goes back to the Encyclopedia of
Religion and Ethics, originally published between 1908 and 1927, one will
find a short entry on Buddhist divination, written by Laurence A. Waddell,
who naturally focused his discussion almost entirely on divination in
Tibetan Buddhism.
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in which [Buddhist] practitioners of divination viewed themselves,
their divinatory practices, and their reasons for practicing
divination.”2
Such studies are extremely important, because the
distinctions between Buddhism and allegedly “non-Buddhist”
practices remain entrenched, having been buttressed by the
widespread modernist concern to distinguish religion from magic
and magic from science. In this way divination usually becomes a
form of magic, and Buddhism oscillates between being either a
“pure” form of religion or more like a rational, secular science/
philosophy, or both, depending on whom you ask. This situation
partly explains the proliferation of scholarly studies of “Buddhist
magic.” It has also prompted scholars to call for renewed
prioritization of traditional and indigenous categories. For instance,
in a footnote on the use of the term magic, Justin McDaniel writes
that it would be “helpful to pay close attention to indigenous terms
that are often translated as ‘magic’ in English as much as possible
when describing non-English-speaking practitioners” (McDaniel
2011: 255). This is important advice, which I will attempt to follow
in this essay. Yet the prioritization of indigenous categories runs a
risk, if studies that engage such a process become as though
hermetically sealed from broader comparative analyses and
concerns.
This essay attends to the sticky web of indigenous
terminology concerning divination and other so-called “mundane”
or “worldly” arts, focusing primarily upon Buddhist canonical texts
preserved in Påli, augmented by references to commentarial and
exegetical literature. It asks: How have some Buddhists, as evinced
in this canonical and exegetical literature, understood the broader
category of “worldly arts,” which includes techniques we call
divinatory? Are Buddhists discouraged from engaging with such
practices, as has been commonly asserted? If so, then for whom,
2

McGuire 2013: 413. McGuire’s article offers the most up-to-date discussion
of divination in Chinese Buddhism and includes a helpful bibliography on
divination in the Chinese context. The most recent survey of divination in
East Asian religions is Guo 2012, which also includes useful theoretical
reflection. Other studies that seem generally consistent with the approach
McGuire advocates include McDaniel 2011, Brac de la Perrière 2012, and
possibly also Phillipson 2007, which attempts to consider the categories of
“Theravåda Buddhism” and “divination” together in a sympathetic way.
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specifically, are such words of discouragement primarily meant?
And why, specifically, are such practices discouraged? Are the
penalties for practicing them severe or lenient? Are there any
exceptions or instances when practicing worldly arts is tolerated or
encouraged? And what might we conclude, more broadly, from the
textual evidence? These tricky questions bear particularly upon the
complex, legalistic body of Buddhist monastic rules and their
interpretation, as well as the interpretation of a few passages from
Buddhist canonical literature that are arguably less straightforward
than has sometimes been assumed or asserted.
Several of the texts examined here have been used to
demonstrate that divinatory practices are not Buddhist, or anyway
not “properly” or “originally” Buddhist, and that the Buddha
himself discouraged them, and all of this despite the fact that such
practices, broadly considered, appear widespread among Buddhists
(including Buddhist monks) across various Buddhist traditions of
South and Southeast Asia, East Asia, and Tibet.3 My focus on these
texts should not be taken to indicate that I think these texts,
canonical or otherwise, should be prioritized over individual
practitioners’ beliefs and practices in determining what is properly
Buddhist. On the contrary, textual studies require an informed
knowledge of historical and contemporary belief and practice, even
though contexts vary across time and place, and the lived realities
that gave rise to the texts of the past are now largely lost. In
addition to historical and ethnographic studies of Buddhist
practitioners of divination, however, revisiting classical textual
sources and lesser-known commentaries can help us to interrogate
and better understand the ostensive connection or lack thereof
among Buddhism, divination, and the so-called worldly arts.
Since this essay remains fairly focused upon texts of the socalled Theravåda tradition, I should add the disclaimer that
3

For China, see McGuire 2013 and the sources she recommends, as well as
Guo 2012. For Southeast Asia, one may profitably consult Brac de la
Perrière 2012, Terwiel 2012, and Quartich Wales 1983, in addition to
McDaniel 2011. For Tibet, see especially Ekvall 1964 and his citations. On
some of the more specific forms of divination practiced in Tibet, see Bacot
1913 on mirror divination, and Laufer 1914 and Mortensen 2003 on crow
divination. Mipham 1990 is a translation of a divination manual written in
the 19th century by the influential Tibetan Buddhist scholar-monk Jamgon
Mipham (’Jam mgon mi pham). Cornu 1997 is a general survey of Tibetan
astrology.
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Theravåda ought not be held up as the benchmark for “traditional
Buddhism,” as has often been done. 4 Indeed, this misleading
identification of Theravåda with traditional Buddhism has
contributed to the misleading conclusion that the supposed
“proliferation” of divinatory practices in Tibetan or Chinese
Buddhism indicates that these traditions are less “traditional” (i.e.,
more influenced by “Mahåyåna Buddhism,” less rigorous with
respect to monastic rules, and so on). While Tibet and China have
their own “indigenous” and “Buddhist” traditions of divination and
similar practices, and while Buddhist monks of these persuasions
have engaged and certainly do engage with them, speaking about
their growth or proliferation within Tibetan or Chinese Buddhism
implies that Buddhist monks have not always been involved with
them. Examining textual evidence in Påli can help us to evaluate
this claim, and the broader contention that Buddhists throughout
Asia, be they Tibetan or Thai, Sinhalese or Taiwanese, are
necessarily doing something antithetical to Buddhist doctrine, if
not practice, when they engage with divination and other so-called
“worldly arts.”
Defining Divination
Divination, like the overarching category term, magic, has
often been applied in cross-cultural analyses in a rather imprecise
manner. If magic has been fairly over-determined, over-theorized,
and perhaps also over-criticized, then it seems to me that divination
has not yet been defined with sufficient analytical clarity for
comparative purposes. Take, for instance, the following definition
excerpted from the Oxford English Dictionary: “the foretelling of
future events or discovery of what is hidden or obscure by
supernatural or magical means; soothsaying, augury, prophecy”
(Simpson and Weiner 1989: IV. 892). Alternatively, in his article for the
Encyclopedia of Religion, Evan Zuesse classifies divination into
three categories. First, intuitive divination is defined as interpreting
an immediate situation through the “spiritual insight” of the
diviner. Second is “possession divination” or “spirit manipulation.”
4

Here I use the term Theravåda advisedly and simply to cover the range of
Buddhist canonical and post-canonical materials written in Påli, and which
form the main focus of this essay. For more on the problematic nature of the
very category of Theravåda Buddhism, see Skilling, Carbine, Cicuzza, and
Pakdeekham 2012.
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Within this category, augury is distinguished from mediumship,
spirit or deity possession, in that the former consists in divining
messages sent by divinities through non-human creatures or things.
Third is “wisdom divination,” which involves interpreting the
operation of impersonal laws within a coherent divine order (Zuesse
2005: 2370-2372).
Both these definitions are extremely, if not impossibly,
vague. A unifying theme appears to be knowledge and/or power of
some sort over affairs of an unspecified nature, but these
unspecified affairs might concern the past, present, or future, and
the source or technique of knowledge or power is decidedly
unclear. It may come from the “spiritual insight” of the diviner,
whatever that is, or from another supernatural agent, contacted
somehow. It may come from supernatural or magical means,
whatever these might be. It may involve interpretation of the
operation of impersonal laws within an overarching cosmic order,
but precisely how this is different from “scientific” knowledge is
not clearly specified.5
One might well question whether the OED or the
Encyclopedia of Religion’s entry on divination, sources that reflect
little or no explicit awareness of Buddhism, are useful for
understanding divinatory practices in Buddhism. They do provide
us with a sense for one of our primary methodological problems,
however, which is that we don’t know precisely what we mean by
divination, making it difficult to identify what kind of practice we
aim to classify by the hybrid expression “Buddhist divinatory
practices.” They also suggest a second and related problem. While
it can and does figure more positively in individual and collective
self-definitions, divination, like magic and superstition, often
carries strong pejorative connotations of irrationality, abnormality
and otherness. Given that divination is a site of contesting
valuations, of identity and difference, can it still serve as a value
neutral term for comparative analysis, or how can it best serve as a
scholarly category for understanding Buddhist doctrine and
practice?
In the Påli Buddhist literature considered here, the primary
indigenous terms for divination are nemmita, nemmitika (or
5

See Ekvall 1964: 251–252, where a similar point is made about definitions
of divination in general.
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nemmitaka), and several others that fall under the broader category
of tiraccha- or (more commonly) tiracchåna-vijjå. Nemmita occurs
most famously in the Mahåpadåna-sutta of the D¥gha-nikåya,
when King Bandhuma calls upon the brahman “diviners”
(nemmitå, “those skilled in interpreting signs or omens”) to have a
look at his son, Prince Vipass¥ (D, vol. 2: 16). They examine the
prince, see the thirty-two marks of greatness on his body, and
predict that he will become either a wheel-turning king or a
buddha. In another passage, from the A∫guttara-nikåya, the term is
used in the context of describing five impediments to rain that
escape the eyes of the “forecasters” (nemmitå) (A, vol. 3: 243).
Despite the fact that the first passage describes what would become
an important narrative element in the standard blueprint of a
buddha’s life, neither of the passages attributes the term nemitta to
a Buddhist. However, the second passage implies that the Buddha
can discern the causes and particular conditions for rainfall better
than do the ostensibly non-Buddhist diviners. Does that make him
a diviner himself, the divination expert par excellence? As we will
see, the answer to this question depends in part on how we choose
to engage the term as an analytical category.
Divination and the Worldly Arts
The best-known reference in Buddhist canonical literature
to the practice of divination, more broadly considered, occurs in a
passage on s¥la or moral restraint that recurs in each of the
discourses that make up the first division of the D¥gha-nikåya. In
fact, this division is probably named the “Morality Section
Division” (s¥lakkhandha vagga) because of the fact that all the
discourses of that division – thirteen in total – contain this same
passage with only minor alterations in the wording to reflect the
different contexts in which it occurs in each discourse. Though the
terms nemmita and nemmitika also appear in this passage, the key
category term found here is tiracchåna-vijjå, an expression
sometimes rendered broadly as “worldly arts,” though its precise
definition and broader connotations are somewhat unclear and
require further discussion.6

6

Often translators have opted to render the term with a greater sense of
disapprobation than I have done here. Rhys Davids 2002: 14, gives “low
arts”; Bodhi 2000: 1019, gives “debased arts”; Walshe 1995: 71, has “base
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Before attending to the specific instances of these terms,
however, a short description of the whole passage should prove
helpful. In brief, it consists of a long list, or rather a list of lists, of
various kinds of moral restraint or activities from which one ought
to refrain. These moral restraints range from some that are central
to Buddhist discussions of moral action, like the lists of five, eight,
or ten moral precepts, to some apparently intended more
specifically for monastics, to some that are less commonly
discussed in Buddhist canonical or post-canonical literature, such
the long list of so-called “worldly arts,” which is our focus here.
The whole passage is divided into “small” (culla), “medium”
(majjhima), and “large” (mahå), and this would seem to refer to the
length of the lists contained within each subdivision, since the
section titles appear to run contrary to the ethical significance of
the lists contained in them. The “small” section contains some of
the most basic or general moral restraints; the lists of the middle
section appear more specific to “religious specialists” (samaˆabråhmaˆå), including Buddhist monastics; the “large” section
continues the theme by elaborating a very long list of tiracchånavijjå or “worldly arts,” nearly one hundred and fifty of them by
Richard Gombrich’s count (Gombrich 1997).
In the Brahmajåla-sutta, the first sutta of the D¥gha-nikåya,
the Buddha offers the whole passage as a list of activities in which,
he claims, “common folk” (puthujjana), that is, non-Buddhists and
“ordinary” Buddhists, praise him for not participating. So, common
folk praise him for not harming living beings, for not taking what
is not given to him, for not lying, and so forth. These are basic
moral restraints found in the small section, towards the end of
which the restraints begin to become more focused on the activities
of “religious specialists,” ostensibly including Buddhist monastics.
The middle section continues this trend, but also begins to
elaborate with more prolixity upon, for instance, what specific
types of shows the Buddha doesn’t attend or on what types of
arts”; Horner 2004: 337, gives “worldly knowledge,” but says in a footnote
that “animal wisdom” is more literal; Gombrich 1997 goes for the rather
more colorful “beastly arts,” though Rhys Davids 1991: 152, had mentioned
earlier that the expression “literally” means “brutish, or beastly wisdom”;
Langenberg 2014 offers “deviant lore.” Among these translators, only
Horner chooses a more neutral option, and yet the Chinese translation of the
term, as reflected in Heirman 2002: 761, would seem to support such an
interpretation.
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comfortable furniture he doesn’t sit, “while subsisting on food
provided by the faithful” (saddhå deyyåni bhojanåni bhuñjitvå).
Thirteen types of entertainment and twenty types of couches are
mentioned. In the final sentence of middle section, the Buddha
states:
Monks, a common person (puthujjano), when praising
the Tathågata, might say, “Whereas some renouncers and
brahmans (samaˆa-bråhmaˆå), while subsisting on food
provided by the faithful, are liars, prattlers, insinuators
(nemmitikå), and disparagers, covetously pursuing gain upon
gain, the ascetic Gotama refrains from such deception and
prattle” (D, vol. 1: 8).7

Following this sentence begins an extensive list of various
types of “worldly arts” (tiracchåna-vijjå) in which common folk
praise the Buddha for not participating, a motley list that includes
quite a few specific practices that we might call divinatory.
The Buddha continues,
Or, monks, the common person, when praising the
Tathågata, might say, “Whereas some renouncers and
brahmans, while subsisting on food provided by the faithful,
make a living through wrong means of livelihood, through
worldly arts (tiracchåna-vijjåya) such as the following: [the
science of the] body (a∫ga-[sattham]), [science of] signs
(nimitta-[sattham]), 8 portents (uppåta), dreams (supina),
physical marks (lakkhaˆa), the gnawings of mice
(mËsikacchina). fire sacrifices (aggi-homa), [fire] sacrifices
with a ladle (dabbi-homa), [fire] sacrifices with rice husks,
[fire] sacrifices with rice powder, [fire] sacrifices with grains
of rice, [fire] sacrifices with butter, [fire sacrifices with ghee,
[fire] sacrifices with the mouth, [fire] sacrifices with blood;
physiognomy (a∫ga-vijjå), geomancy (vatthu-vijjå),

7

8

Note the translation of the term nemittikå here. Rhys Davids translated the
term as “diviner” (Rhys Davids 2002: 14). While the term does sometimes
mean diviner, here it probably means “hinting” or “insinuation,” as it
commonly does when it appears in this particular list of terms. See Cone
2013: 641.
D, vol. 1: 9. The words given in brackets have been supplied from the
commentary (DA, vol. 1: 92), because many of these terms are rare and
difficult to interpret without the help of the commentary.
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geomancy (khatta-vijjå)9, skill with charms (siva-vijjå), skill
with ghosts (bhËta-vijjå), skill with creatures living in the
ground (bhËri-vijjå), skill with snakes (ahi-vijjå), skill with
poison (visa-vijjå), skill with scorpions (vicchika-vijjå), mice
augury (mËsika-vijjå), bird augury (sakuˆa-vijjå), crow
augury (våyasa-vijjå), knowing a person’s lifespan (pakkajjhåna), protection against arrows (sara-parittåna), and
[knowing the] animal world (miga-cakka) 10 —the ascetic
Gotama refrains from such worldly arts as these.”

The above translation includes only the first of seven
paragraphs listing various types of tiracchåna-vijjå.11 Already we
begin to see the motley nature of the category, while subsequent
paragraphs elaborate further on such practices as gemology, animal
husbandry, geomancy, physiognomy, astronomy, astrology,
forecasting the weather, predicting natural disasters, predicting
current and future successes in battle or business, arranging
auspicious times for marriages, mirror divination, spirit possession,
sorcery, poetry, accounting, metaphysical speculation or “worldly
knowledge” (lokåyata), and many types of medical practice,
including prescribing emetics, purgatives and ointments, as well as
practicing surgery and pediatrics. Upon surveying this long list of
tiracchåna-vijjå, we are immediately confronted with a problem
not dissimilar from the one we face in defining divination: the
daunting breadth and heterogeneity of the category.
Also apparently obvious is the extent to which the passage
tries to emphasize that the Buddha does not engage with such
practices, that they are not appropriately “Buddhist.” When faced
with such a broad condemnation, one might ask: Are the practices
themselves problematic, or is the primary object of criticism the
covetous intent behind the practices, make a living from such
practices while subsisting on food provided by the faithful? Or are
both problematic? Or does something else lie behind the apparent
criticism of these practices? Who shouldn’t engage with them?
9

10

11

The commentary suggests that the difference between these two types of
geomancy is that the former concerns houses while the latter concerns fields
and plots of land.
The commentary suggests that this refers specifically to recognizing animals
based on the sounds they make.
The list of tiracchåna-vijjå continues from page 9 to the middle of page 12,
while the commentary on the list runs from pages 92 to 98.
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These are important questions, but before attending to them, we
ought first to see whether we can gain any further clarity on the
meaning and nature of the practices generally classified as
tiracchåna-vijjå, especially if we wish to understand whether and
how some Buddhists conceptualized “divination.”
Another canonical passage, from the Samyutta-nikåya,
offers a narrower range of practices representative of tiracchånavijjå. It tells the story of an encounter between one of the Buddha’s
foremost disciples, Såriputta, and a non-Buddhist, female ascetic
name Sucimukh¥. She approaches Såriputta and asks whether he
eats facing downwards, upwards, or in any of the ten directions.
Såriputta says that he does not. So, Sucimukh¥ asks him how he
does eat? In his response, Såriputta humorously correlates eating
downwards, upwards, and facing the four intermediate directions
with “religious specialists” who “make their living by wrong
means of livelihood,” namely, by the “worldly arts” (tiracchånavijjå) of “geomancy” (vatthu-vijjå), “astrology” (nakkhatta), and
“physiognomy” (a∫ga-vijjå), respectively. He equates those who
eat facing the four quarters of north, south, east and west with
those who make their living by the wrong means of livelihood of
running long errands and working as a messenger. “Sister,” says
Såriputta by contrast, “I seek alms correctly (dhammika, that is,
according to the Dhamma), and having sought it, I eat my alms
correctly.” Suc¥mukh¥ then goes throughout the city proclaiming
that the followers of the Buddha eat “correct” (dhammika) and
“blameless” (anavajja) food, and urges people to give food to the
followers of the Buddha.12
Worldly Arts, Worldly Talk, and Wrong Means of Livelihood
In the examples above, the “worldly arts” are subsumed
under the broader notion of “wrong means of livelihood”
(micchåj¥va) and more specifically concern the way in which
12

S, vol. 3: 238–240. Much of this discourse is also cited in the encyclopedic
compendium of Buddhist doctrine sometimes called the Mahåprajñåpåramitå-śåstra, which was partially translated from Chinese and
extensively annotated by Etienne Lamotte (1981: 199–202). McBride 2005
(especially pp. 94–95, and footnote 30) also cites this passage, but reads it
as affirming straightforwardly that Buddhist monks practice divination.
McBride’s interpretation appears to disagree with both the Påli text and
Lamotte’s translation of the Chinese.
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“religious specialists,” including Buddhist monks, “make their
living” (j¥vikaµkappenti). As a passage in the commentary on the
Sucimukh¥-sutta (SA, vol. 2: 247) discussing geomancy makes clear:
“They earn a living by wrong means of livelihood”
means that they earn a living by precisely such wrong means
of livelihood considered to be the worldly art of geomancy.
They live subsisting off the provisions given by people
pleased by the preparing of those sites. That is the meaning.

A canonical passage from the Cullaniddesa (Cn 258) makes
this connection even more explicit by contrasting people who
acquire and consume things blamelessly and those who do so in a
blameworthy fashion:
Concerning “those who do not accumulate [possessions]
and enjoy [things, particularly food and clothing]
blamelessly,” there is the person who enjoys [things] in a
blameworthy fashion and there is the person who enjoys
[things] in a blameless fashion. And what type is the person
who enjoys [things] in a blameworthy fashion? Here, such a
person makes a living through deceit, prattle, insinuation
(nemittika), and disparagement, covetously pursuing gain
upon gain. [He makes a living by] offerings (dåna) of wood,
offerings of bamboo, offerings of leaves (patta), offerings of
flowers, offerings of fruits, offerings of baths, offerings of
soft powders (cuˆˆa), offerings of coarse powders (ma††ikå),
offerings of toothbrushes (dantaka††ha), and offerings of
rinse-water for the mouth (mukhodaka). [He makes a living]
through bribery with bean-soup (muggasËpyatå, though
bean-soup-ness?), with nourishment (påribha†yatå), and with
a soft seat (p¥†hamaddikatåya). [He makes a living] through
geomancy, worldly arts (tiracchånavijjå), physiognomy, and
astrology. [He makes a living] through running long
errands, being a messenger, being a walking gofer
(ja∫ghapesaniya). [He makes a living] through practicing
medicine (vejjakamma), making repairs (navakamma),
serving out alms, and administering offerings. He makes a
living, having obtained, acquired, achieved, and gained
goods by [such] incorrect (adhamma), improper (visama)
[means]. Such a person is called one who enjoys [things] in a
blameworthy fashion.

In the passage cited above, a number of different activities
come together under the general category of wrong means of
livelihood, including some activities we have already seen and
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some we have not. Interestingly and unusually, “worldly arts”
(tiracchånavijjå) appears here as an individual member of a subset
of four terms that also includes geomancy, physiognomy, and
astrology. In the later commentary on the parallel passage in the
Mahåniddesa (MnA, vol 2: 401), we find these four terms explained
further:
In respect to “not by geomancy” and so forth, the science
of knowing whether a village, a market town, a house, and so
forth is well positioned or ill positioned is called geomancy.
An art that does not lead one out (aniyyånikattå) [of the
cycle of rebirth], [and] that runs crosswise/horizontal to the
paths [leading to] heaven or liberation (saggamokkhamaggånaµ tiracchåna bhËtå), such as the science of
physiognomy (a∫gasattha), omens (nimitta), and so forth
[and] the remaining arts (avasesa vijjå), is called a worldly
art (tiracchåna vijjå). Knowing whether a man or woman is
lucky or unlucky by the marks on the body is called
physiognomy. The science of knowing connections with the
stars is called astrology.

Here the commentary apparently attempts to weave
together information drawn from the morality section and the
Sucimukh¥-sËtta to normalize and explain the unusual set of four.
At the same time it includes a gloss on the term tiracchåna-vijjå
similar to one we find in several other places in the commentaries
that explain the expression “worldly talk” (tiracchåna-kathå): that
such talk does not lead to liberation, but rather runs crosswise to
attaining it or heavenly rebirth (DA, vol. 1: 88).
K. R. Norman, who has treated this expression in one of his
lexicographical studies, suggests that this explanation has all the
trappings of a folk etymology. Although the term tiracchåna
(possibly for tiraßcina in Sanskrit, as derived from tiryac or
tiryañc) literally means oblique, transverse, horizontal, sideways,
or awry—Edgerton (1953: 253) suggests that related tiras may also
mean “outside”—the term commonly refers to animals of all sorts,
as they generally move horizontally across the earth. Being limited
to relatively few instances in the canonical and commentarial
literature, however, tiracchåna-vijjå and tiracchåna-kathå look
like idiomatic expressions. The latter appears to refer to everyday
or idle topics of conversation. The standard list from the morality
section enumerates such topics:
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Talk of kings, thieves, great ministers, armies, fears,
battles, food, drink, clothing, beds, garlands, perfumes,
relatives, vehicles, villages, small towns, cities, countries,
women, alcohol, streets, wells, those who have died, diverse
topics, speculation about the world, speculation about the
ocean, and about becoming or not becoming this or that.13

Norman points out that the same list is enumerated
elsewhere in the canon, but called “village talk” (gåma-kathå), and
described as “worthless” (h¥nå), “associated with the village”
(gammå), “common” (pothujjanikå), “ignoble” (anariyå) and
“unconnected with the goal” (anatthasaµhitå), that is, liberation.14
In a somewhat similar manner, the commentary on the nuns
monastic code glosses the term tiracchåna-vijjå as “foreign”
(båhirakam) and “unconnected with the goal” (anatthasaµhitå).15
These passages suggest broader and somewhat more vague
notions about what precisely constitutes tiracchåna-vijjå, apart
from the fact that such practices seem clearly defined as nonBuddhist or at least not appropriately Buddhist. The
Dvemåtikåpå¬i, a later Burmese compilation of monastic rules and
commentary upon them, seems to confirm this impression, while
further muddying the water on the precise nature and scope of
tiracchåna vijjå:
[The expression] mundane art [refers to] whatever art
that is foreign (båhiraka), does not achieve the goal [of
Buddhism] (anatthasaµhita), [and] is used to harm others
(parËpaghåtakara), particularly [such arts as] training in
elephants (hatthi), horses (assa), and chariots (ratha),
training in swordsmanship and archery (dhanutharusippa),
and use of mantras (manta) and tonics (agada), such as those
from the Atharva Veda (åthabbaˆa), to harden (khilana)
others [that is, to kill them], to gain mastery over others

13

D, vol. 1: 8–9. The translation mostly follows Rhys Davids 2002: 13–14. No
animals are specifically mentioned, nor are these topics animals are likely
discuss with one another, except perhaps in the Pañcatantra. For his part,
Norman suggests that the list once did include a reference to animals, which
has since dropped out. See Norman 1993: 156.

14

M, vol. 3: 113. See Norman 1993: 155.

15

V, vol. 4: 305. See Horner 2004: 337.
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(vas¥karaˆa), and to dry out (sosåpana) others’ bodies [that
is, to mummify them?], and the rest.16

Here we see specific mention of the condition that such
practices have the purpose of doing harm to others. Thus, certain
types of basic training in warfare are highlighted alongside a
variety of practices that we might consider “magic” of a
particularly sinister variety. Note the absence here of many of the
basic divinatory practices emphasized in preceding citations.
Instead, the passage seems to emphasize not only a certain array of
practices, but also the intent to harm.
Another passage, from the Khuddasikkhå and
MËlasikkhå—monastic manuals that Charles Hallisey (1990: 207)
has explained as being written to “provide even more practical
guidance”—describes tiracchåna-vijjå as follows:
[Activities] that increase desire, hatred and confusion
(rågadosamoha-va∂∂håni), [activities] condemned by the
Buddha and the rest (buddhådi-garahitå), [activities]
moving, going, proceeding crossways (tiro), or horizontally
(tiriyato) to heaven and liberation, [such as] poetry, dance
and so forth (kabbanå†akådikå), all those fields of
knowledge (sabbåpi vijjå), or it should be known to be
comprised of what is verily not in accordance with the
discipline (vinayayuttitopi), having ascertained the practice
of the discipline by what goes along [with it] and what
important [rules] should be upheld (KM, 399).

In addition to elaborations upon the folk etymology, this
passage emphasizes the Buddha’s condemnation of such activities,
perhaps making oblique reference to the morality section of the
D¥gha-nikåya, and provides the added idea that such practices
actually increase the root afflictions. Again, the focus is on certain
practices, but also upon intent, and the relationship between action
and intent. After mentioning poetry and dance as particular types
of such activities, the passage concludes with a seemingly more
general statement that the worldly arts comprise whatever activities
are deemed not to accord with the monastic discipline!

16 Dm, 334. This same passage is also found in the Vinayavinicchaya-Ṭikå
(VvṬ, vol. 2: 98).
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Should Monks and Nuns Practice Worldly Arts?
These last two examples come from compendia of and
exegetical works upon the section of the Buddhist canonical
literature that most directly concerns the regulations governing the
behavior of Buddhist monks and nuns. The canonical and
commentarial literature on the monastic code also contains two
instances in which the practice of “worldly arts” is specifically
mentioned. One is the fifth section of the Cullavagga, a
miscellaneous section on what are called “minor matters”
concerning the behavior of monks. 17 The second is the nuns’
monastic code or påtimokkha itself, in a section on minor
infractions (påcittiya) requiring confession. 18 This may be a
significant point: Whereas the nuns' code does contain an explicit
rule prohibiting the practice of “worldly arts,” the monks’ code
does not, the discussion in the Cullavagga notwithstanding.19
The passage in question in the nuns’ section of the Vinaya
begins:
At that time, the Blessed One was staying in Såvatth¥ in
the Jeta Grove in the forest retreat of Anåthapiˆ∂ika. At that
same time, the group of six nuns learned the worldly arts.
People complained, criticized and denounced them, saying
“Why, indeed, are nuns mastering the worldly arts, just as
though they were householders enjoying [material]
pleasures!”

The Buddha comes to learn about the criticism and makes a
rule prohibiting nuns from mastering the worldly arts. A second
17

V, vol. 2: 138. See Horner 2001: 194–195.

18

V, vol. 4: 305-306. See Horner 2004: 337ff.
This might be what Gombrich has in mind when he describes the prohibition
on monks “taking an interest” in “such matters” as astrology as a “principle”
and “not a formal rule.” See Gombrich 1988: 205. Though her main focus is
more specifically on the healing arts, Amy Langenberg has recently
speculated on the possible reasons for what she perceives as a
“disproportionate focus on nuns” in these and related prohibitions in
Buddhist Vinaya collections. See Langenberg 2014. Incidentally, the
monks’ code does seem to have an explicit rule pertaining to the practice of
tiracchåna-kathå. See V, vol. 4: 165, and vol. 1: 188ff. However, Norman
notes that the passage does not specifically prohibit tiracchåna-kathå, but
rather monks entering the village at the wrong time. See Norman 1993:
155–156, and Horner 2004: 82, especially footnote 3.

19
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rule closely follows this one, focusing on nuns teaching the
worldly arts to others. A brief commentarial paragraph lists certain
exceptions to these rules: “It isn’t a fault, if she masters ‘writing’
(lekha), ‘mneumonics’ (dhåraˆa), ‘protective utterances’ (paritta)
for the purposes of protection, if she is crazy (ummattikå), or if she
is a first-time offender.” 20 These exceptions aside, the passages
offer no specific definition of the “worldly arts.” However, the
language of the criticism leveled against the nuns seems to echo
other passages and suggests that making a living or earning
material benefit from the practice of the worldly arts is the main
problem.
Thus, the question becomes whether the practices
themselves are improper for some reason, or if the attitude or intent
behind them is more important. I tend to agree with Gombrich
(1997: 175) when he writes: “The main point is that it is wrong to
make a living out of these practices, to do them for profit.” This
seems to place the emphasis on the intent behind the practice. 21
There seems to be a close connection drawn between monks and
nuns practicing the worldly arts, making a living by wrong means
of livelihood, and acquiring material possessions. While there may
be something objectionable about the practices themselves, the
broad scope of what might legitimately be included in the category
of the worldly arts, combined with a relative lack of serious
punishment for practicing them, suggests that the censure may be
largely rhetorical in nature. Again, citing Gombrich (1988: 205), “a
breach of this principle [that monks take no interest in the worldly
arts]...was no doubt a common and trivial occurrence.”
Rhetoric can still become reality, as attested by the Kalyåni
inscriptions erected by King Dhammacet¥ in 1476. The inscriptions
testify to one of the purification reforms of the Buddhist monastic
institution undertaken periodically by Burmese kings. In this case,
the inscriptions mention practicing the worldly arts, such as the
20

21

V, vol. 4: 306. The passages in the Cullavagga are virtually identical, apart
from the gender, though they are shorter, without commentary, and the
offense is deemed less serious, a dukka†a rather than a påcittiya.
I would further suggest that this line of reasoning seems largely consistent
with John Strong’s recent reinterpretation of the rule prohibiting monks and
nuns from displaying superhuman powers in front of laypeople, a rule found
in the same section on miscellaneous minor offences in the Påli Vinaya. V,
vol. 2: 110–112, and Strong 2012.
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medical arts, carpentry, arithmetic, and so on, as one of the reasons
for “sinful” monks being expelled from the monastic institution
during the reform, a punishment well out of proportion with the
monastic code (Taw 1892: 99–100). Yet, one would be hard-pressed,
I think, to conclude from such rhetoric that the apparently
widespread practice of the worldly arts among Buddhist monks at
the time was truly the motivating reason behind the monastic
reform.
Buddhist Divination?
In spite of an apparent trend towards vagueness and
rhetoric in defining the overall class of so-called “worldly arts,”
some scholars have found descriptive historical value in the long
lists of fairly specific, if obscure, practices that we find proscribed
in the morality section. For instance, David Pingree, the leading
authority on ancient Near Eastern and Indian astrological systems,
published a short essay that drew attention to similarities between
the D¥gha-nikåya and some Mesopotamian omen manuals. The
similarities he saw occur both in the basic terminology and in the
specific ordering of the terms in the list. He thus hypothesized that
Mesopotamian omen manuals had a direct influence on Indian
systems of divination. He surmised that this contact was facilitated
by the spread of the Achaemenid Empire into Northwest India and
the Indus Valley. 22 Whether or not Pingree’s hypotheses are
correct, the evidence indicates that such practices were associated
with at least some members of a generic class of “religious
specialists” in ancient India, a class that generally included the
Buddha and Buddhist monks and nuns. Perhaps the evidence even
suggests the commonality or popularity of such practices among
Buddhists. As Richard Gombrich (1997: 174) puts it: “As so often,
we find out most about what people were up to, or might have been
up to, from texts telling them what they were not allowed to be up
to.” Yet, one wonders how much closer we are to an understanding
of the specific nature of the practices intended by the terms, and
their significance, that is, why Buddhists might wish to learn or
practice them and why other Buddhists may have thought them
objectionable for the Buddhist monk or nun.
22

Pingree 1992: 375–379. See also Knudsen 2008. For a general survey of
Indian systems of divination, see Esnoul 1968.
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The distancing or “othering” effect we see in these
passages, which works to distinguish the attitudes and activities of
the proper Buddhist monastic from those of a similar class of
“others,” results in a blanket characterization of what appear to be
many different kinds of activity under a common, general category.
In this way, one might perceive an interesting parallel with modern
western definitions of divination. In the modern case, however, the
distinction has been drawn not only between religion and magic,
but also between magic and science. Does the same set of
distinctions also hold in the case of our Buddhist examples? Is the
PTS dictionary accurate, for instance, when it glosses tiracchånavijjå as “pseudo-science”? (Rhys Davids and Stede 1921–1925: 303). For
this to be so, I would argue, these Buddhist texts would have had to
distinguish not only between religion and magic in a more
traditional sense, but also between magic and science in a more
modern sense. In other words, one would need to see doubt clearly
expressed about the practical, this-worldly efficacy of such
practices, and not simply doubt about their efficacy for the
purposes of achieving liberation. It is true that Gombrich has
sensed skepticism about the efficaciousness of the practices in the
fact that the passage in the morality section says that the food is
“given in faith.”23 Yet, I can see no clear distinction made there or
elsewhere between good and bad science or between efficacious
and inefficacious mundane technologies. Therefore, if a sense of
“magic” does remain about the category of tiracchåna-vijjå, it
seems the more classical sense of magic drawn in contrast to true
religion: magic seen as mundane technique or skill with utilitarian
purpose and possibly even malevolent intent.
This contrast may become clearer when we consider two
additional passages from Buddhist canonical literature. Both
passages feature the Buddha performing “divinations” (in a broad,
neutral sense of the term) through the use of his special powers,
particularly his knowledge of the arising and passing away of
living beings, or what is sometimes called the “divine eye”
(dibbacakkhu). Even though it is often classified as “worldly”
23

Gombrich 1997: 174. In an earlier publication, however, Gombrich writes:
“...the Buddha himself condemned astrology, palmistry and all similar
practices, though his condemnation was specifically directed against their
practice by monks: he did not deny their possible validity, but declared them
a distraction from the road to salvation.” See Gombrich 1971: 148–149.
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(lokiya), the divine eye is not normally classified as a “worldly art”
(tiracchåna-vijjå). Instead, it features as one of several powers that
stand at the heart of certain canonical articulations of Buddhist
awakening and the liberating knowledge and power entailed by it.24
The Buddha’s knowledge of the arising and passing away of living
beings appears to justify in an epistemological sense the enormous
genre of Buddhist narrative literature known as apadåna or
avadåna, stories in which the Buddha repeatedly and without
hesitation “divines” the karmic connections among past, present,
and future actions and circumstances. In this way, the notion of the
divine eye or knowledge of the arising and passing away of beings
nicely captures what Robert Ekvall (1964: 253–254) calls the spatial
and temporal dimensions of divination.
There are many instances in Buddhist canonical literature in
which the Buddha uses his divine eye. Both passages I want to
consider come from the second section of the D¥gha-nikåya. One is
the Janavasabha-sutta, and the other is found in the well-known
Mahåparinibbåna-sutta, which tells of the Buddha’s final days
before passing into nirvåˆa. 25 Both passages relate certain
happenings at the “Brick Hall” (giñjakåvasatha) at Nådikå. The
Janavasabha-sutta begins by describing an instance in which the
Buddha is “foretelling (byåkaroti) the rebirths of his followers up
and down the countryside whose time had come and had recently
died” (D, vol. 2: 200). News of the Buddha’s words spreads around
the community to the great delight and amazement of his followers.
Ónanda then hears the news and wonders why the Buddha has not
explained any of the rebirths of his devotees in other countries like
Magadha, where people like the famous King Bimbisåra had lived
and died. After Ónanda asks him about this apparent oversight and
he mulls it over in his mind, the Buddha sits down and resolves, “I
shall know their place (gati) and condition of rebirth
(abhisamparåya),” and he does so. The Buddha then proceeds to
inform Ónanda, and Ónanda informs others, and thus the Buddha’s
message spreads widely among the populace. In this discourse, no
criticism is made of the Buddha’s practice, nor is any suggestion
made that the Buddha doesn’t engage in such matters. It seems a
perfectly normal thing for him to do.
24

For an overview of these concepts in Påli canonical literature, see Clough
2010.

25

The former is found at D, vol. 2: 200–219, and the latter at D, vol. 2: 91–94.
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The Mahåparinibbåna-sutta tells another episode of the
Buddha performing divination. During his final tour about the
country, the Buddha again visits the Brick Hall at Nådikå, and
perhaps in an allusion to the Janavasabha-sutta, Ónanda asks the
Buddha to divine the fates of several Buddhists who have died
there. The Buddha begins to do so, but soon grows weary of
divining the fates of each and every person; he is, after all, nearing
the end of his life. He proceeds to teach Ónanda a method he calls
the “Mirror of Dharma” (dhamma-ådåsa). This method turns out
simply to be faith in the Buddha, his teachings, and community,
but by means of it, the Buddha claims, the Buddhist devotee may
discern his own fate. The phrase dhamma-ådåsa evokes an
expression found in the long list of “worldly arts,” namely ådåsapañha or “mirror divination,” literally “questions by means of a
mirror.”
Despite certain differences, both these passages depict the
Buddha as agreeing without apparent hesitation to perform what
one may well wish to call “divinations,” though in a way that
upholds the Buddhist Dharma and relies upon particular categories
the tradition deemed central to it. In this way, one may perceive the
problem with limiting our understanding of divination in Buddhism
to the so-called “worldly arts.” By doing so, one unwittingly
highlights certain passages that seem to deny, almost by definition,
the very existence of Buddhist divination. Consequently, one may
well overlook evidence like the Janavasabha-sutta or the
Mahåparinibbåna-sutta, or if one does take such evidence into
account, then one interprets it as describing something other than
divination. Alternatively, one might account for the difference by
placing greater emphasis on the intentions behind the actions rather
than the actions themselves. In either case, the concept of
divination appears as a site for contesting valuations, of identity
and difference, posing a problem for those who would apply a
single, value neutral concept of divination to a matrix of terms that
exist in a state of tension.
"Worldly" and "Otherworldly"
This same tension is expressed within Buddhist discourse
by the distinction between so-called “this-worldly” (lokiya, lokika)
and “otherworldly” (lokuttara) orientations or values. This
distinction must be among the indigenous Buddhist scholastic
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classifications to have been employed most commonly in modern
analyses of Buddhism. It has often been used to distinguish
Buddhist from non-Buddhist, and to supply the Buddhist
“equivalent” of the distinction between the religious and the
secular or the sacred and profane. 26 More recently it has come
under criticism for failing to encapsulate the complexity of
Buddhism on the ground. After briefly discussing the lokiya/
lokuttara opposition and its commonplace application to Theravåda
Buddhism, not only by scholars but by educated, modern Thai
Buddhists influenced by modern scholarly representations of
Buddhism, Justin McDaniel (2011: 115) concludes: “The lokiya/
lokottara [sic] distinction is not very useful in describing Thai
monastic life.” “Many Thai monks are multitaskers,” he explains,
but he goes further. If we remove the mundane from the
supramundane, if we associate the worldly with magic and
characterize it as non-Buddhist, McDaniel argues, then this
effectively removes agency from thousands of practicing Thai
Buddhists and makes their everyday concerns and activities
something tangential to Thai Buddhist life.
While I substantially agree with McDaniel’s point, I do not
think the lokiya/lokuttara distinction is itself the problem. Rather,
the way it has often been utilized has not helped to show how
closely the practices and beliefs designated by these terms are
intertwined in many Buddhist understandings. The distinction has
less commonly been perceived as embodying an internal tension
within Buddhism, which is the line of interpretation I want to
pursue here. For support, I want to draw upon several passages that
deploy the lokiya/lokuttara distinction.
In the Milindapañha, for instance, King Milinda asks how
the Buddha could have had previous teachers, yet still say that he
has no teacher, no equal, no rival in the world of gods and men.
The Buddhist monk Någasena explains that the Buddha’s previous
teachers, including the eight specialists who interpreted the marks
upon his body at birth, the Brahmin expert in the Vedic sciences
who taught him as a boy, the god who inspired him to renounce the
world, and his first two meditation teachers who taught him while
he was still practicing asceticism were all “his teachers in regard to
26

See, for instance, Ames 1964, Spiro 1975, Tambiah 1970, and Gombrich
1971 and 1997.
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the dharma (teaching, reality) of the world” (åcariye lokiye
dhamme). “Yet, in regard to this dharma that is preeminent in the
world (imasmin ca lokuttare dhamme),” Någasena continues,
“there is no teacher surpassing the Tathågata (natthi tathågatassa
anuttaro anusåsako) who could have led him to comprehend the
knowledge of the all-knowing ones” (sabbaññuta ñåˆa
pa†ivedhåya) (Mp 236). In this way, Någasena resolves the apparent
inconsistency, and emphasizes the preeminence of the Buddha and
his insight over other forms of “worldly” knowledge. He does not
deny that the Buddha had worldly teachers or possessed worldly
knowledge.
The way I have translated lokuttara here might seem
controversial, but I am emboldened to do so in part by a comment
that Justin McDaniel makes in a footnote: “[John] Holt noted in his
2004 keynote address at the Exploring Theravada conference at the
National University of Singapore that lokuttara is often
mistranslated and should be read as ‘pre-eminent in this world,’ not
as ‘otherworldly’ or ‘non-worldly’.”27 I agree with Holt, but would
add that lokuttara can suggest both meanings, otherworldly and
preeminent in this world, simultaneously. The Buddha and his
teachings and activities are lokuttara in both senses of the term in
that what is reckoned preeminent in the world is also what leads to
the highest goal of liberation from the world. Accordingly, for the
Buddhist apologist, only the Buddhist path would lead to this goal,
for it is the one based on the Buddha’s authentic, liberating insight.
In similar fashion, a Buddha’s awakening is commonly described
as anuttara, “unexcelled.” Thus, lokuttara may be shorthand for
“Buddhist,” but only in a particular rhetorical or ideological sense.
By extension, lokiya, “this-worldly,” would not necessarily
mean “non-Buddhist,” but not exclusively Buddhist, that is, shared
among many traditions.28 Insofar as the Buddha also possesses such
an array of “worldly” knowledge and powers, another implication
is that these are techniques with which the Buddha engages the
world out of compassion. One finds a noteworthy example of this
usage in the Påli commentaries, where the Buddha’s “teaching
27
28

McDaniel 2011: 255, note 98.
David Seyfort Ruegg has pursued this line of reasoning in several
publications, though not without criticism. See Seyfort Ruegg 1964, 2001,
and 2008.
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knowledge” (desanå-ñåˆa) is called “worldly” (lokiya) and is said
to “arise from compassion” (karu˜å-pabhåvitaµ), in contrast to the
Buddha’s “penetrating knowledge” (pa†ivedha-ñåˆa), which is
called “supramundane” (lokuttara) and is said to “arise from
insight” (paññå-pabhåvitaµ). Interestingly, however, both these
forms of knowledge are said to be “unique to Buddhas”
(buddhånaµyevaorasaµ) and “not shared with others”
(aññehiasådhåranaµ).29
These latter passages do not directly concern the so-called
“worldly arts” (tiracchåna-vijjå), practices that the passages
discussed earlier generally seem to consider foreign to Buddhism
and not oriented towards the goal of the Buddhist path. Instead, the
commentary here explains that the Buddha might engage the world
out of compassion through the use of knowledge and powers that
the tradition generally considers central to Buddhism. However,
the passages do suggest one way in which a Buddhist practitioner
of divination might explain how divinatory practices could
resonate with Buddhist soteriological values. Garry Phillipson
(2007) begins to suggest other ways in which divinatory practices
might be so conceived. Moreover, H. G. Quartich Wales, in his
study of divination in modern Thailand, informs us that Buddhist
monks specializing in it, including respected abbots of monasteries,
model their behavior on that of Moggallåna (Quartich Wales 1983: ix).
Among the Buddha’s foremost disciples, he is the monk most
renowned for his superhuman powers. Thus, although the so-called
“super knowledges” (abhiññå) and “worldly arts” (tiracchåna
vijjå) seem mutually exclusive categories at first glance, perhaps
Buddhist practitioners of divination and other worldly arts perceive
a stronger connection between them. Certainly, they both seek to
straddle the tension in Buddhism between this-worldly and
otherworldly values and orientations in a productive fashion.
Conclusion
The questions of the place of divination and the so-called
“worldly arts” in Buddhist doctrine, and whether Buddhist monks
and nuns ought to engage in such practices, and if not, then why
not, all appear less obvious than many scholars have previously
29

See Endo 1997: 81, and the several primary sources he cites there.
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thought. The category of “worldly arts” seems rather vague in
itself, and the formal and less formal prohibitions against their
practice by Buddhist monks and nuns are arguably unclear with
respect to what precisely the main problem is: the practices
themselves, whatever they might be; making a living from such
practices; or the intention behind the practices. Moreover, certain
other practices or techniques that an outside observer might well
consider divinatory, but that the tradition calls by different names
and, for one reason or another, appears to consider properly
Buddhist, are not condemned and are even encouraged.
This hermeneutical situation should prompt a broader
consideration of how we conceive and apply analytical categories
in the study of Buddhism. Rather than critically considering the
meanings of terms and the contexts for their usage in traditional
Buddhist discourses, certain concepts have been taken to provide
indigenous structural oppositions that could be exploited in order
to draw analytical contrasts between religion and magic and
between magic and science. This reflects a common concern found
in numerous strands of intellectual and everyday discourse in
modern times. I do not wish to separate “Buddhism” too much
from “us,” for indeed the central theoretical standpoint of this essay
has been that it is both necessary and useful to consider them
together. However, we need to be careful about seeing Buddhism
through the prism of our own preconceived analytical structures.
Given the subtleties and differences of context, we also must
remain cautious about reproducing Buddhist rhetorical selfunderstandings, and using them as guiding principles in our
academic studies of Buddhism without critical reflection on the
particular circumstances in which such particular understandings
are generated and diffused.
When seen in the light of our comparative analysis, neither
the rational/irrational dichotomy nor that between science and
pseudo-science—distinguishing which has been such a strong
modern concern even among apologists for the category of
religion—seems to be clearly reflected in the classical Buddhist
literature we have examined in this essay. Nevertheless, on the
interpretation offered here, Buddhist literature depicts Buddhists as
being very much engaged in the affairs of this world, and the
supposedly “otherworldly” rhetoric reflects and can even be made
to justify this engagement. Therefore, perhaps the question we
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should be asking isn’t so much where forms of divination practiced
by Buddhists originated, or whether they are “Buddhist” or “nonBuddhist,” or whether Buddhist monastics should or should not be
practicing them. There seems to be ample evidence that they do,
and probably always have, despite the ambivalences in the tradition
towards doing so. Instead, echoing McGuire, I would argue that we
should be attending more carefully to what it means that Buddhist
monastics practice divination, how those who do perform
divinations understand what they are doing, and how we might
better understand Buddhism and ourselves in light of this fact.
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